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China has in recent years embarked on a fresh policy of close 
cooperation with her former antagonists, the Western countries, not 
only in economic areas, but also on social, military and political 
issues. Does this mean that China has given up her highly 
publicized third world position? Or did China ever genuinely belong 
with the third world in the past? These questions are explored in 
the thesis through careful analyses of the origins of China's 
foreign policies as well as comparative observations of their 
applications to different countries at different stages. Rather 
than isolating individual variables, as some writers do, in 
measuring their impact on the outcome of China's policy, this study 
takes a contextual approach, combining normative analysis with 
empirical observation, and blending historical and contemporary 
perspectives. It concludes that China's differentiation of 
international political forces should not suggest that China was 
identifying herself permanently with any one of them, but rather 
was simply adopting a dialectical approach toward world politics. 
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Pref ace 
The intrinsic dialecticism of social science has bedevilled 
attempts to explain China's foreign policy behavior from a 
particular point of view. on the one hand, it is relatively easy to 
demonstrate the motivations behind Chinese policies by isolating 
the individual factors such as communist ideological aspirations, 
strategic calculations, or historical legacies that shape the 
policies. On the other hand, due to the complex nature of China's 
foreign policy process and the delicate relationships between the 
influencing factors, an analysis that is less than comprehensive is 
doomed to failure. As the case of the three world doctrine 
indicates, China's foreign policy process is just like those of 
other nations, determined by internal as well as external 
situations, and shaped by ideological as well as non-ideological 
aspirations. 
This thesis rejects the traditional methods that categorize 
China's foreign policy, either as one of Marxist revolutionism that 
seeks to destroy capitalism by violence or one of classical 
expansionism that derives its source from China's past imperialism. 
Instead, it incorporates the methods of normative-empirical 
analysis and examines the impact of each variable that forms 
China's foreign policies in context. After a brief survey in 
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Chapter I of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the current 
modes of study, Chapter II reviews the formulation of the three 
world doctrine from a combination of theoretical and historical 
points of view. It emphasizes in particular the interactions 
between Marxism, Maoism, the Chinese world view, and Sino-soviet 
relations and examines the impact of such interactions on the 
Chinese policy making process. The study then proceeds, in 
Chapters III, IV, and V, to trace the modification and adjustments 
of the three world doctrine in its application to individual 
nations or regions, such as the developing countries, Western 
Europe, Japan, and the United States, in 1 ight of the world's 
changing political climate. In conclusion, the thesis suggests that 
China's foreign policy, as exemplified by the three world doctrine, 
consists of several dimensions and operates dialectically in 
practice. While the third world has always occupied the most 
prominent place in China's policy pronouncements, the first world--
-the United States and the Soviet Union ---is the true focus of 
China's policy makers. No momentous· breakthrough is claimed as a 
consequence of this study regarding the measurement how much each 
of those variables contributes to China's foreign policy outcomes, 
but I believe that it has established some fresh explanatory 
linkages among them. 
The completion of this study is indebted to the help and 
support of many individuals at various stages of its origin and 
writing. The Carver Fund gave me early financial support that made 
my academic endeavour at the University of Richmond possible. The 
vi 
encouragement of my parents in China sustained my high spirit 
throughout the whole course of my two years of studies away from 
home. Above all, my gratitude gbes to Dr. John w. Outland and Dr. 
Sheila Caparico whose advice and supervision gave the thesis its 
present form. 
Xu Guojun 
University of Richmond, Virginia 
March 2, 1992 
vii 
Introduction 
The theory of three worlds, which differentiates the three 
forces in international politics, was officially inaugurated by 
Deng Xiaoping in 1974 at the Sixth Special Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly. Deng Xiaoping declared that in the 
international arena the United States and the Soviet Union---the 
two superpowers---constituted the first world, the underdeveloped 
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America formed the third 
world, and the other developed countries apart from the two 
superpowers made up the second world. Deng also pledged that 
China belonged to the third world and would always stand by its 
side in its struggle against imperialism and to establish a more 
just world order. 1 
Since the birth of the PRC in 1949, the Communist regime has 
carried out a perplexing series of foreign policies: it has 
supported anti-West national liberation movements; it has 
supported insurgent guerrillas in some countries trying to 
overthrow their governments; but it has also courted the 
"militarist" Japan and the "imperialist" Great Britain and even 
cooperated with the "hegemonist" United States. How and to what 
1 see Peking Review April 19, 1974. pp.6-11. 
extent in fact, then, have China's foreign policy and her global 
strategy been dictated by the three world theory? To what extent 
has China led or followed, helped or hindered the elusive 
struggle of the third world? What, indeed, does China intend to 
achieve by dividing the world into three parts? Is there any 
discernable pattern in China's relations with the rest of the 
world? And finally, what are the sources that made up this 
peculiar foreign policy? These are some of the most important 
questions which require more attention now that China, whether it 
is with the first world, the second world, or still the third 
world, has become an active and influential member of the world 
community. 
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Chapter I: The Methodology Of Studying 
Chinese Foreign Policy 
It is no simple matter to sort out the variables from the 
constants in the patterns of behaviour characterizing China's 
approach respectively to the three worlds. The difficulty lies in 
how to differentiate between Beijing's public pronouncements and 
short term tactics on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
underlying motivations, perceptions, assumptions, goals, and 
long-range strategies that have together shaped China's foreign 
policy patterns. So far, as can be seen in the various contending 
and conflicting explanations offered by scholars and diplomats, 
the endeavour has not been very successful. One view, for 
instance,. declares that China's foreign policy has roughly 
followed the guideline of the three world theory---either by 
appearance or nature China is a third world country seeking 
changes in the existing world structure. Another view argues that 
there is no coherence at all in China's diplomatic practice and 
her much publicized theory. Still a third view contends that 
China's foreign behaviour differs little from those of other big 
powers. Of even more interest, many researchers and analysts have 
not infrequently found themselves in contradiction with their own 
previous conclusions as time moves on. 
Without doubt, the failure to achieve a consistent 
explanation is, to some extent, due to the complex nature of 
China's foreign policy---its fluidity, flexibility and 
multidimensionality---but it is also certain that the failure is 
attributable to some methodological shortcomings in scholastic 
inquiry. At the risk of oversimplification, the current research 
of China's foreign policy could be summarized into four lines of 
inquiry. The most common line approaches the issue through 
analysis of ideological factors such as government statements and 
official pronouncements. The second approach concentrates on 
rational analysis that looks into China's national interests and 
builds everything around them. A third line focuses on China's 
bilateral relations with individual countries, such as Japan, and 
tries to find a pattern in such relations. Concerns with the 
impact of the international environment on China's foreign policy 
constitute a fourth area which is sometimes called "systemic 
analysis." Needless to say, each of these four lines of inquiry 
has contributed to the discovery of the truth in its own way. But 
since all of them start from a particular standpoint, their 
analyses are often misleading or one-sided at best. 
The Ideological Approach 
The most popular mode of inquiry is the ideological 
approach. 1 Writing in China's Future, Allen s. Whiting argues 
1 Representatives of this school are found in Allen s. 
Whiting, A. Doak Barnett and R. G. Boyd who argue that ideology 
is at the base of perception and thus decision-making. 
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that China's foreign policy has been motivated by an ideology 
that finds expression in the Leninist exertion of power to 
destroy capitalism by violence. Although other factors also bear 
upon China's policy-making process, Whiting declares, "the 
communist ideology is the basic reference point from which the 
Chinese understand world affairs, set policy goals, and define 
the legitimate means of pursuing these goals". Consequently, any 
effective efforts to probe the nature of China's foreign policy 
cannot but start with the role of the ideology. 2 
In so far as ideology means the ideas at the basis of some 
economic or political theory or system, 3 in so far as China has 
become in many ways a symbol of the postwar ideological challange 
to the established order in world politics, and in so far as 
Marxism-Leninism is part of the total array of theories and 
operational principles of China's foreign policy, the inquiry is 
relevant. Relevant, too, is the unique role of ideology in the 
politics of China. According to F. Schurmann, for instance, 
ideology in communist countries plays a unique role which could 
not be found in non-ideological societies. It "legitimizes 
authority, integrates the community, rationalizes or justifies 
policy decisions, and assists bureaucratic or elite-mass 
communications and provides ligitimate foci for popular 
2 See Allen s. Whiting China's Future McGraw-Hall Book 
Company, NY:1977. p.38. 
3 The Concise Oxford Dictionary London:l960. p. 589. 
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emotions."4 During the forty years it has controlled the country, 
the Chinese Communist Party has staged one campaign after another 
aimed to "unify its people's mind" and to bring them in step with 
its policy decisions. Its media---the People's Daily and the Red 
Flag Magazine---has carried from day to day two constant themes: 
the danger of US imperialism and Soviet revisionism. Political 
indoctrination was also conducted through factory assemblies and 
farm meetings. To a certain extent, the Chinese Communist Party 
did succeed in planting in its people's consciousness a sense of 
hatred against the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, 
whether from a normative point of view or practical point of 
view, it is imperative to probe the role of ideology in China's 
foreign policy making. However, does this mean that China's 
public statements, newspaper editorials and popular slogans tell 
everything about China's policy making process? In other words, 
is the ideological component an adequate enough means for policy 
analysis? 
Much evidence suggests that reliance on ideological analysis 
alone would not necessarily lead to discovery of Peking's foreign 
policy goals. Instead, it could sometimes end up in mere 
speculation. One could ask, for instance, if Mao Tsetung was so 
possessed by the Leninist idea of world revolution, why did he 
choose to limit his role to that of "communicating experiences" 
with his third world allies, rather than directly exporting 
4 F. Schurmann Ideology and Organization in Communist China 
Berkeley:1970. pp.58-73. 
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revolutions to them? If Mao Tsetung was so preoccupied with the 
Marxist goal of destroying capitalist countries, how could China 
trade with Britain, France and Japan more than with Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria? or one could make the following 
observation: both Mao Tsetung and FDR called upon their countries 
to become "arsenals"--- one the "arsenal of revolution," the 
other "the arsenal of democracy. 115 Disregarding their moral 
implications, is there any difference, in terms of policy 
instruments, between the two ideological calls? Looked at from 
these perspectives, the ideology model is not able to solve the 
basic analytical problems, such as: how is it possible to 
distinguish meaningfully between a foreign policy that is 
ideological and one that is not? In ideology-oriented policies, 
how and how much ideology is translated into policies? And how is 
it possible to determine "the ideological content of an action 
which benefited the state performing it in some conventional way, 
such as by improving its power, prestige or security? 116 
5Mao Tsetung said that "We China ... are not only the 
political centre of world revolution, but moreover in military 
matter and technology must also become the centre of world 
revolution ... we must become the arsenal of world revolution" in 
1967 at the height of China's "Cultural Revolution. FDR made his 
call---the call upon America to become the arsenal of democracy--
-during the Second World War when the whole world faced the 
threat of Hitler. I see that ideological propaganda and 
instigation are policy tools that both ideological and 
nonideological coutries would use at certain time. see also Allen 
Whiting China's Future p.42. 
6 see J.D. Armstrong. Revolutionary Diplomacy University of 
California:l977. p.6. 
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After all, what is ideology? In one sense, ideologies are 
"sets of values and beliefs. 117 They are presumed to have 
universal validity and to be applicable to all circumstances. 
Thus, they are necessarily stated in general, broad, abstract 
forms, and, like law, they have to be interpreted and their fit 
tested in every specific case. In another sense, ideology is a 
consciousness which is characterized by fluidity and change. It 
changes in form and content in accordance with time and 
conditions. A "false consciousness 118 , in particular, could be 
mere pretense, propoganda or simply a disguise that conceals 
reality for political uses. As Marxists, the Chinese Communists 
are not blind followers to Marxist dogmas. Instead, they have 
displayed considerable flexibility in applying Marxism to their 
activies in China. In his writings, Mao Tsetung time and again 
admonished his cadres of the danger of blind adherence to theory 
in defiance of reality in studying Marxism and Leninism. On one 
occasion, he even went so far as to warn them "We should not be 
misled by our own propaganda."9 It is clear, then, that while 
there could be no doubt about the Marxist nature of the Chinese 
regime, it is equally true that Marxism has been very much 
localized and nationalized in China during its forty years of 
7see Werner Levi's article "Ideology, Interests and Foreign 
Policy" In International Studies Quarterly Vol.14, No. 1, March 
1970.p.4. 
8 see Hans J. Morganthau Politics Among Nations NY:1966. 
pp.83-6. 
9 Allen s. Whiting China's Future p. 43. 
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practice. The effectiveness of the ideological approach to 
understanding China's foreign policy is, therefore, largely 
dependent upon the extent to which Marxism-Leninism has been 
translated into or manipulated in the policy process. 
The "National Interest" Approach 
The second popular approach adopts "rationality" as its basis 
of analysis. "No modern statesman has ever claimed that he 
committed his nation simply to prove its trustworthness or ever 
led his nation to fight against an ideology quo ideology. Even 
the Holy Alliance, intended by czar Alexander to enforce 
Christian values in the governement of Europe was a piece of 
sublime mysticism and nonsense," as Werner Levi pointed out in 
his article "Ideology, Interests and Foreign Policy" published in 
the March 1970 issue of International Studies Quarterly. 10 This 
school thus emphasizes that China's foreign policy should and 
could be explained only in terms of "national interests"---her 
desire for security, political and economic benefits. While the 
Marxist ideology is discarded as disguising the regime's true, 
interest-motivated objectives or as performing a rationalizing 
function by presenting its self-interested behaviour in terms of 
noble ideas, "national interest" is thought to signify "realism" 
10 Werner Levi "Ideology, interests and Foreign Policy" in 
International Studies Quarterly Vol. 14, No.1, March 1970, p.6; 
see also Hans J. Morganthau In defense of National Interest NY: 
1951. 
9 
and "pragmatism" on the part of the foreign policy 
administrators. 11 The Chinese peace offensive at the 1956 Bandung 
conference and the 1958 offshore island crisis, for instance, are 
interpreted as being motivated by Beijing's need to develop its 
internal economy. And the different stages of China's foreign 
policy are said to result from a rational analysis of China's 
needs and her capabilities. True, "national interests" as policy 
goals are more observable than ideology and can be deduced from 
policy outputs. But like ideology, the concept of "national 
interest" is also ambiguous: it could refer to the particular 
interests of one nation state against another; it could also 
denote the interest of group within a community. If the 
international peace environment Zhou Enlai was promoting at 
Bandang would help China's first Five-year Plan at home, 
"national interest" could be a good explanation for China's "five 
principles" diplomacy. If the international crisis of 1958 could 
prod the various political factions at home to unite behind a 
domestic development program, "national interest" could also be a 
fine explanation for the linkage between the 1958 Taiwan Strait 
crisis and Mao's commune program. If, however, the Bandung peace 
policy and the Taiwan Strait crisis policy are juxtaposed in the 
light of "national interests", the explanations simply create a 
case of contradiction. The recent fact that massive cooperation 
with the United States and other western countries was possible 
only with the simultaneous emergence of Deng Xiaoping and the 
11 Hans J. Morganthau Politics Among Nations NY:l966. p.5. 
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disappearance of the Gang of Four is another indication that 
"national interests" is an invariably subjective concept and it 
alone is incapable of explaining China's foreign behaviour. 
Moreover, from an historical perspective, the Chinese concept of 
"national interests" has changed dramatically from one period to 
another. How to evaluate realistically China's foreign policy 
goals, therefore, requires a wider apporach than trying to 
determine the concept of "Chinese national interests." 
The Dyadic Approach 
A third favoured mode of studies is to look into China's 
dyadic relations. If neither ideology nor "national interest" is 
objective and substantive enough to reach the general truth 
behind China's policy-making, then the best way is to examine 
case by case China's attitude toward individual countries. As an 
intermediate step leading tword a general consideration of the 
totality of China's foreign policy, studies of her bilateral 
relations certainly have value. They can lead to abundant 
empirical findings and perhaps yield low-level generalization for 
theory building. The examination of China's relations with Japan, 
for instance, will give us insight into China's attitude toward 
a neighbouring capitalist country which is economically powerful 
and strategically important. However, studies that stop at the 
dyadic level can never, from the methodological point of view, go 
11 
beyond the level of ad hoc explanations, nor can they add much 
theoretical value to the study of Chinese foreign policy. 12 
The case of Sino-Japanese relations does not point to the 
rationale behind Sino-British relations or Sino-French relations, 
let alone illuminate how the relationship with one country could 
affect the relationship with another. There are simply too many 
differences between each case to produce deductive power through 
this approach. 
The Reactive Approach 
A fourth approach is to adopt a reactive view of China's 
conduct of foreign relations in both geographical and functional 
areas. 13 "Whatever the power of ideology, whatever the personal 
influence of Mao Tsetung, and whatever the desirability of each 
objective, the Chinese Communist Party could not transcend the 
time and environment in which it was placed. Its decisions of 
policy toward the United States, the Soviet Union and the third 
world were determined ... by the international political 
configuration of the time and China's geopolitical position.nu 
12 Hsiung and Kim China In the Global Community Praeger: 
1980. p.3. 
13 One theory is Richardson's reaction process which argues 
that nations, like individuals, usually behave toward others as 
others behave toward them. Another theory is that of the 
environmentalists such as Harold Sprout and Halford Mankinder 
that sees factors such as geography, demography, resource 
distribution .•. as determining the foreign approach of a country. 
Although the two theories are different in their emphasis, they 
share the common characteristic of environmental determinism. 
u Hsiting and Kim. ibid. p.8. 
12 
rt is, therefore, essential to have a systemic view of 
international relations when we come to study China's foreign 
policies. Like other countries on the world stage, China must 
respond to changes in her external environment; she must 
constantly adjust her policy postures toward any given country in 
light of its posture changes, leadership shifts, socio-economico-
political developments and other occurances in the international 
system. In the early 1950s, for instance, China leaned toward the 
Soviet Union when she was threatened by the United states. She 
leaned back to the us in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the 
soviet Union became the bigger threat and the us changed its 
hostile attitude. A comparison of China's foreign aid with that 
of the Soviet Union, for another example, yields insight into 
China's regional priorities and the impact of Sino-Soviet 
competition on China's policies toward specific third world 
countries. China's aid pattern seems to move along with 
opportunities arising out of circumstances where Soviet influence 
was absent, as in East Africa, or had gone sour, as in Sudan and 
Egypt.IS However, as with previous approaches, any attempts to 
focus solely on circumstances will risk the same danger of 
''seeing the tree and missing the wood." For one thing is 
certain, foreign policy making, like a drama whose plot develops 
with the interaction between roles, is not a passive process. 
Rather, it involves the wills and initiatives of the policy-
IS Other cases include the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with Rwanda, Brundi, Cameroon, Togo, Tunisia and Zaire. 
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maker. When certain external factors come to bear, a foreign 
policy maker does not respond in the rebounding manner a spring 
does, but through perception of the event---its positive as well 
as negative implications. One could choose to act, or not act, in 
whatever manner one deems most appropriate to his or her 
interests. Otherwise how could we explain the triangle 
relationship between the United States, China and the Soviet 
Union? Or how could we explain China's competitive aid programs 
to Ethiopia and Somalia . 16 
The contextual Approach 
In short, all of the methods discussed above carry with them 
a one-sided bias or an ad hoc suspicion. The fault with them, as 
James c. Hsiung has pointed out, is that no single variable 
stands above the decision-making process, and all are subject to 
redefinition in response to changing times. A focus on any single 
one of them will yield little or no understanding of Peking's 
actual policy behaviour or outcome. What is needed, therefore, 
is to develop a systematic framework which could remedy ad hoc 
with coherence. In other words, we need to adopt a contextual 
16 Both Somalia and Ethiopia rank high on the Chinese and 
Soviet grantee list. The fact that China entered those countries 
later than the Soviet Union and offered them more generous aid 
programs indicates China's intention to balance off Soviet 
influence there. see John A. Cringen and Steve Chan Chinese 
Crisis Perception and Behaviour: A Summary of Findings Paper 
delivered at the JCCC Workshop On Chinese foreign Policy.Ann 
Arbor, Mich. Autust 12-14, 1976. 
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approach which would cross-check and weigh all possible variables 
of a foreign policy in a related manner. 
A contextual approach to Chinese foreign policy analysis 
should at least consider three possibilities. First, it should 
seek to establish a foreign-domestic, historical-present 
linkage. 17 This is not merely to juxtapose descriptions of 
important domestic and foreign events, or descriptions of past 
history and present events. This can at best help explain 
particular connections between specific sets of domestic and 
foreign data at certain times and produce some low level 
generalizations. Instead, a contextual approach should seek to 
establish some coherent explanatory relationships on such levels 
as the machinery of foreign policy making within China's 
political system, the (practical] effects of external 
stimuli/demands, [the psychological effects of sentiments 
accumulated from past experiences] and China's foreign policy 
outputs. All of this would be very much along the lines that 
James N. Rosenau has developed. 18 For instance, China's 
cooperative posture toward the United states should be linked to 
the fall of the leftist faction within the Chinese leadership, to 
the need of the Four Modernization Drive, to the aspiration to 
revive her power status, to her historical sentiment toward 
Tsarist Russia, and to the reassessment of the international 
1969 
17 see James N. Rosenau ed. Linkage Politics NY: Free press. 
18 James Rosenau. Linkage Politics 1969. 
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situation. A complete understanding of China's shift in foreign 
policy in 1978 could not be reached without addressing all those 
variables. 
Second, the contextual approach needs further to sort out the 
relative weight of those variables often involved in foreign 
policies, some of which may actually be competing for the 
attention of the decision makers. These factors include 
ideological preferences, national interests, historical 
experiences, political culture, domestic structure and political 
attributes, systemic factors, conditions in the international 
system, real and perceived capabilities and so on. They occupy 
different positions in the policy making process at different 
times. In the 1950s, for instance, national security towered 
above all other concerns, while in the 1980s economic demands 
downplayed the interests of ideological promotion. One must also 
ask, how does the relative weight of each factor change? 
Precisely because these concepts are subject to constant 
redefinition, it is essential to examine these diverse sources of 
foreign policy in order to understand properly what the policy 
goals are in a given case. 
Finally, the contextual approach needs to look into the 
complexity of different levels and types of China's external 
relations, that is official and unofficial, bilateral and 
multilateral, political and economic, substantive and symbolic 
and so on. Different from most other countries, whose foreign 
policies almost exclusively deal with state relations, China's 
16 
foreign policy gropes along several dimensions at the same time. 
In China, international relations are regarded as a situation in 
which social, economic and political forces---some identified 
with particular national states and others cutting across 
national lines---are contending for supremacy. International 
relations are, thus, not only, or in many situations not even 
primarily, a matter of conventional dealings between nation and 
nation, or government and government. Official government policy 
and government-to-government relations are, it is true, important 
aspects of China's foreign policy, but the Chinese approach to 
foreign policy demands the use of every possible instrument, 
formal and informal, overt and covert, to influence and shape the 
changing pattern of social, economic and political development 
outside China's borders. A noticable example is China's treatment 
of its relations with the Burmese government in the early 1960s. 
When Burma's prime minister, Ne Win, visited China in 1963 and 
was given a ceremonious reception in Peking, the Burmese 
communist party was praised for its armed struggles against its 
government in Ragoon. The Chinese explained this dichotomy as a 
function of the difference between state-to-state and party-to-
party relations. 19 Therefore, it is important to watch those 
linkage questions: how are "unofficial relations used to promote 
or deter official relations? How do multilateral relations affect 
China's bilateral relations, or vice versa? When do public 
19 A. Doak Barnett Communist China and Asia London: Oxford 
University Press. 1960. p.71. 
17 
pronouncements remain propaganda and when do symbolic relations 
become substantive? Failure to distinguish them will result in 
omitting an important aspect of China's foreign policy behaviour. 
This list is not conclusive, and perhaps may never be 
conclusive. Since Chinese foreign policy is exceedingly complex 
and flexible, we have to take an extra step in order to find 
approximate truth. 
18 
Chapter II The origins Of The Three world Doctrine 
It has by now become clear that the main intention of the 
three world doctrine was to counterbalance the influence of the 
United states and the soviet Union by rallying the support of the 
underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America as 
well as promoting the neutrality of the developed countries in 
Europe and Japan. If, however, one is to further assess the 
validity of this strategy, one needs, first of all, to examine 
the context from which it was derived. Although the three world 
doctrine was officially inaugurated by Deng Xiaoping in 1974, it 
was developed by Mao Tzetung much earlier, 1 and its political and 
philosophical roots are to be found in several places, including 
Mao Tsetung's revolutionary ideology, his nationalistic world 
view, the characteristics of the international environment, and 
the conditions of China's military, economic and diplomatic 
development. This chapter will study the impact of such facftors 
as the changing Sino-Soviet relations, the Chinese world view, 
Maoism, and the current international situation on the 
formulation of China's foreign policy. 
1 The term "three worlds" was first used by Mao Tsetung in a 
conversation between him and an African leader in 1972. The 
evolution of the theory may even traced to Mao's talk with the 
American correspondent Anna Louise Strong in August 1946. see Mao 
Tsetung Selected Works 1969, Vol.4. pp.97-101. 
The Impact of the Sino-soviet Split 
Numerous factors motivated China to formulate the three world 
doctrine, but what appears to be the immediate cause is the 
collapse of the Sino-soviet alliance. During the 1950s, the 
Chinese accepted the Soviet view that the world is divided into 
two hostile and irreconcilable camps---the socialist camp and the 
capitalist camp, and followed a foreign policy of "leaning to one 
side." Through the period of ten years the two sides had close 
cooperation on an extensive range of issues and signed a series 
of agreements on mutual assistance, credit, railway cooperation 
and port leases. According to a Soviet statistics, 
more than 10,000 Soviet experts and specialists were sent to 
China to help industrial construction, while about 1000 
Chinese scientists, 10,000 engineers, technicians and 
skilled workers received training in the USSR. While more 
than 11,000 Chinese students were trained at Soviet higher 
educational institutions, the Soviet Union turned over to 
China more than 24,000 sets of scientific and technical 
documents, including 1,400 projects of large industrial 
enterprises. 2 
The effect of this cooperation was so obvious that the relation 
between the two countries was celebrated by leaders both in 
Peking and Moscow as "a great alliace between two socialist 
countries" and "a powerful guarantee of China's independence and 
security. 113 By the end of the 1950s, however, the friendship 
began to go sour for apparently ideological reasons. Khruschov's 
2 the report of Mikhail Suslov, secretary of the CPSU, to 
the Soviet Congress 14 Feb 1964. cited in John Gittings Survey of 
the Sino-Soviet Dispute Oxford:1968.pp.28-36. 
3 Wu Yu-chang "Sino-Soviet Friendship and Unity Among the 
Socialist countries" People's China No.2, 16 January 1957. pp.4-
5. 
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denunciation of Stalin and his call for co-existance with 
capitalism at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 was 
considered by the Chinese as "sheer betrayal of Marxism". 4 Then 
in 1959, the Soviet government stopped all its aid programs to 
China and called back all its technicians and adivsors currently 
working on Chinese projects. Finally, in 1964, both the Soviets 
and Chinese began to deploy massive military forces along their 
borders. 
Some people have wondered why, since both the Chinese and the 
soviets shared the same ideological objective, they could have 
turned against each other in the pursuit of that ideological 
objective. Others have suggested that as disputes developed in 
the course of cooperation, they were contradictions of a 
cooperative nature. Indeed, nothing could be further from the 
truth than to suggest that China could have been kept in the camp 
by its ideological orientation or that the final split could have 
been avoided if both sides could have compromised with each other 
a little. For one thing, the two-camp doctrine is theoretically 
characterized by inherent dilemmas. As defined by many theorists 
and practitioners of international relations, international 
politics is a process of determining the position of each country 
4 see the Editorial in The People's Daily July 14, 1964 "On 
Khruschov's Phony Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the 
World". see also A. Doak Barnett China after Mao Princeton 
Press:l967. p.123. 
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in the structure of international political economy. 5 From a 
more pessimistic point of view, in particular, political power in 
the international system is so distributed that the gaining by 
one country necessarily means the losing by another. The two-camp 
doctrine which requires the subordination of one nation to the 
other is, therefore, inherently incapable of answering the 
fundamental questions posed to politicians regarding the 
independent role of each nation in international affairs. The 
policy dilemmas will only stand out when placed in the context of 
big power relations. According to Professor Chun-tu Hseuh's 
research, what actually determined the course of development 
behind the ideological disputes were two issues, both of which 
surmount China's security and independence. One of them was the 
different views of strategy against the United States who was 
then China's major threat. The policy of co-existance with 
capitalism would mean, in the Chinese perspective, no less than 
open indulgence of US hostility toward China. The other issue 
was "the five unreasonable demands" put on China by the Soviet 
government. According to Professor Hsueh's interpretation of Geng 
Biao, China's vice premier and defence minister, who commented on 
the issue at the Chinese Embassy in Washington in 1979, the five 
demands included the permanent stationing of Soviet forces in 
Port Arthur, the establishment of a joint fleet under Soviet 
5 Ferguson and Mansbach explain that one of the premises of 
political realism is that competitive power politics, realist 
style, is the alpha and omega of international relations. see 
Ferguson and Mansbach.The Illusive Quest University of South 
Carolina:l988. p.89. 
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command, the establishment of a Soviet influence in the 
development of resources in the Northeast and Northwest provinces 
of China, the establishment of a long-wave radio station in China 
for naval communication under soviet control, and the institution 
of a division of labour between the two socialist countries---
China would be responsible for agricultural production and the 
soviet Union for industrial development and supplies. It is clear 
to any person of reasonable judgement that these demands, if 
accepted, would effectively deprive China of her sovereignty. 
Under these circumstances, as Huan Xian said, the Chinese 
government could not but come to the conclusion that the Sino-
Soviet Alliance had, in effect, become "a dead lane" for China. 
For her independence, she had but to pursue "a third road. 116 
The Impact of the Chinese World View 
From a sociological point of view, the external policy of a 
nation is always shaped by her image of herself. A glimpse into 
China's history and China's national sentiment would exclude any 
imagination that China would follow the two-camp doctrine in a 
truthful manner. In The Logic of International Relations, Steven 
Rosen and Walter Jones have suggested that 
The world outlook of communist China since 1949 has been 
deeply influenced by history. Unlike the Soviet Union 
or the United states, China has been seared by exploitation, 
humiliation and oppression. The seemingly endless waves of 
foreign conquerors passed through China within the memory of 
the current generation of leaders. The difference between 
6 See Huan Xian "China's Foreign Policy" in Peking Review 
April 11, 1974. p.32. 
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the sturdily independent and self-sufficient China before 
is obvious even to its enemies. Without exaggeration, the 
overriding consideration of Chinese foreign and domestic 
policy has been the restoration and preservation of China as 
a powerful and independent nation invulnerable to external 
conquest and domination."7 
It is completely understandable how strongly China felt about 
her past and future. While classical China was a vast empire, 
self-proclaimed as "the centre of civilization", throughout the 
19th and a good part of the 20th century she suffered a great 
deal of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers. She was 
forced by the threat of foreign military power to accede to a 
series of "unequal treaties", in which she agreed to indemnify 
large amount of money and to open almost all of her important 
ports. The Treaties of Nanjing, Tianjing and Beijing, in 
particular, by which China lost her control over trade tariffs 
and vast territories including Hong Kong, Kowloon and the Amur 
and Ussuri Rivers basins, 8 almost deprived China of all her 
sovereignty. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of China's first 
republic, described his feeling, 
we are the poorest and weakest country in the world, 
occupying the lowest position in world affairs; people of 
other countries are the carving knife and the serving dish 
while we are the fish and meat. 9 
7 Steven J. Rosen and Walter Jones, The Logic of 
International Relations Winthrop Publishers: 1986. p. 122. 
8 The territory China lost to the Tsarist Russia alone was 
about three times as large as France. cited in The History of 
China.commercial press:1985.pp.79-83. 
9 Sun Yat-sen San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the 
people Shanghai Commercial Press:1928. p.12. 
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The resulting sentiment among the Chinese people was 
necessarily a strong sense of bitterness and a strong desire for 
change. To paraphrase John K. Fairbank, in those years no Chinese 
could be Chinese without having a dedicated conviction of the 
innate worth and superiority of Chinese culture, and no Chinese 
could be a patriotic Chinese without a dedicated commitment to 
driving foreign presence out. 10 Suffice it to say here, as an 
inheritor of this national mentality, the Chinese Communists 
would pursue a foreign policy that was revisionist in nature. 
While it would not take violent actions to seek changes in the 
international structure, it would also not be willing to 
subordinate itself to the will of any other nation, no matter 
what kind of regime that nation was. 
The Impact of Maoism 
The Chinese communists are heir not only to a civilization 
with a great imperial past, but also to modern revolutionary 
ideologies. The Chinese foreign policy formula includes the 
following basic principles which together constitute Mao 
Tsetung's Thought: 
1. the idea of a two-stage revolution in colonial and 
semi-colonial countries, leading from a bourgeoisie-
democratic stage to a socialist stage; 
2. the concept of a broad united international front to 
include all positive forces; 
3. the strategy of unity and struggle within the united 
front toward the middle or neutral elements; 
4. the need for a strong military force as backsupport; 
10 John K. Fairbank The Chinese World Order Harvard: 1968. 
pp.89-95. 
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and 5. the need for flexibility and compromise in the 
process of struggle. 
From an analytical view, this formula is a misture of Marxist 
dialectism and Chinese materialism, of Marxist revolutionary 
romanticism and Chinese traditional pragmatism. 
The ultimate question along this line of thinking, therefore, 
whittles to that of Mao Tsetung's philosophy, his way of looking 
at social development. 
Central to Mao Tsetung's philosophy is his epistemology that 
contradictions are inherent in every object and that it is the 
prevailing of one aspect of the contradiction over the other that 
makes social development. Revealingly, of all Mao's theoretical 
works, "On Contradiction" and "On the Correct Handling of 
Contradictions among the People" are designated by the CCP as the 
handbooks that all of its cadre must read. Categorically, Mao's 
vision focuses on two points. One is that he sees the historical 
process in terms of a conflict between the two major opposing 
forces. He emphasizes that 
In the relationship between the various contradictions, 
one and only one is supposed to be the principal 
contradiction that ncecssarily determines the 
development of others. All others are secondary and can 
be easily solved as they are subordinated to the 
resolution of the principal contradiction. 11 
At the same time, Mao Tsetung recognizes that the resolving 
of secondary contradictions is helpful to the resolution of 
principal contradictions. He emphasizes that principal 
contradictions, after all, exist on the background of secondary 
11 Hsiung and Kim China in the Global Community. p.21. 
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contradictions. When background disppears, the major drama will 
not last long. Therefore, as an alternative, one could also 
approach an issue by resolving easier and minor contradictions. 
The third Maoist emphasis is that in methdology 
contradictions should be seen as the substance of social life, 
dialectics as the analytical method of understanding 
contradictions, and struggle as the necessary process of 
resolving contradictions. contradictions are prevalent in all 
things. They rise, resolve, and rise again in a seemingly 
endless, wavelike motion. From a purely philosophical point, this 
epistemology is the most fundamental. Otherwise, how could one 
understand that the imperialist Europe and the militarist Japan 
should be categorized differently from the United States. The 
teaching of this epistemology, as far as foreign policy is 
concerned, will not be mistaken: in the process of struggle, 
one's focus should shift from time to time, from place to place 
and from actor to actor. While the target should be certain in 
each phase of struggle, conflict, competition, coexistence and 
cooperation are all permissible forms of action, as long as the 
archemeny will be weakened. 
The Impact of the International Environment 
While theoretical dilemmas and national sentiments undercut 
the validity of the two-camp policy, neither can Peking's 
approach to world affairs be understood solely in terms of its 
own aims and motivations. Communist China does not operate in a 
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vaccum. Its policy, like that of other nations, is shaped to a 
considerable degree by a process of action and interaction 
between itself and other major powers, and between its leaders' 
ambitions and the stubborn realities of the outside world. 
The Chinese attitudes toward and relationship with the two 
strongest powers are fundamental factors shaping China's 
policies. Since achieving power in China, the Communists have had 
to adapt their policy continuously to the requirements and 
limitations imposed by the changing attitude of the United States 
and the soviet Union. The basic power struggle between the big 
two had determined China's every major maneuver on the world 
scene. China and the soviet Union are geopolitically placed in 
competitive positions. 12 Both are provided by nature with great 
power potential, such as size and population, and are also placed 
in proximate geographical locations. While China is the largest 
and historically most influential country in Asia, the Soviet 
Union, being a Eurasian country, also has a stake in the region. 
Moreover, the Soviet Union is a largely landlocked country which 
has no easy access to the Pacific Ocean without going through 
the Sea of Japan or the Sea of China. Consequently, the 
relationship between the two countries has always been 
tl Geopoliticians such as Harold Sprout, Halford Mankinder, 
and Alfred Mahan point out that the foreign policies of a nation 
are more determined by its geographical characteristics. See 
Patrick M. Morgan Theories and Approaches to International 
Politics Brunswick:NJ, 1987. pp.58-67. 
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characterized by suspicion. 13 This is, of course, not to suggest 
geographical determinism, but one need simply remember how France 
and Germany had fought over Alsace-Lorraine and the Sarr. 
Consequently, the ideological assumptions behind the two-camp 
doctrine were constantly violated, despite the ideological 
convergence between the two states. Two of Mao's and Stalin's 
secret speeches are revealing, 
Mao: In 1950 I argued with Stalin in Moscow for two months. 
We argued about the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and 
Alliance, about the joint stock companies, about the border 
questions.u 
Stalin: We invited the Chinese comrades to come to 
Moscow ..• The Chinese comrades agreed here with the views of 
the Soviet comrades, but went back to China and acted 
otherwise.u 
If the two parties could not have a single mind in the hayday 
of the Cold War, could they maintain their relations from further 
deterioration as world politics moved from bipolarism to 
policentrism? Toward the turn of the 1950s, the divergence 
between the two sides became so wide that they turned into open 
rivals. While the ever-growing appetite of the Soviet Union, as 
underlined by its intervention in Eastern Europe, demanded 
further submission from its campfellows and meant to deprive them 
of national sovereignty, the Chinese grew an ever-stronger desire 
to pursue their own foreign policy interests and to play their 
13 Notice in the previous section, one of the five demands 
the Soviet union put on China was the use of Port Arthur. 
14 cited in Mao Tsetung Long Live Mao Tsetung Thought 1967. 
15 Vladmir Dedijer Tito p.322 (New York:Arno press,1953) 
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own role on the world stage with the gradual buildup of national 
capability, and especially with the imminent acquisition of the 
nuclear bomb. 
What could be said about China's reasons for joining the 
Soviet camp is, therefore, that they represented more of a 
measure of expediency than an expression of ideological devotion, 
more of an intermediate tactic than of a final goal. It should be 
remembered clearly that when China came onto the world stage in 
1949 she was confronted by a stark reality that directly 
threatened her existence. She was militarily and diplomatically 
besieged by the United States and her allies and after 30 years 
of civil war, her economy was almost prostrate and needed urgent 
outside support. In the words of Camelleri, 
"If China decided immediately after Liberation to lean to 
the Soviet side, it was largely because at the height of the 
Cold War there was little possibility of a middle road; 
if its alliance with the soviet Union was not to consolidate 
its independence, its struggle for revolution was 
th . 16 no ing .•• 
Whatever her original intentions, the fact is 
that by joining the soviet camp China protected her vulnerable 
independence from US pressure with Soviet military deterrence, 
helped revive her prostrate economy with Soviet credit, and 
quickened her developing pace with Soviet technology. 
Following the above line of explanation, a second question 
naturally surfaces about the three world doctrine: what logic 
16 see camerilleri Chinese Foreign Policy Seattle:l980. 
pp.47-53. and Yahuda China's Role in World Affairs st. Martin's 
Press:l978. p.43. 
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does it follow that the world should be so divided? Again, this 
question has to be looked at from several angles. To some extent, 
it represents a problem of tactics and organization. With the 
collapse of the Sino-soviet alliance, China was militarily and 
diplomatically besieged on all sides, not only by the United 
states but by the Soviet Union as well. Indeed, China perceived 
collaborations and collusions between the Soviet Union and the 
United States to strangle her on the world stage. Given the great 
gaps in national capabilities between the two sides and the stark 
reality that the world was so polarized that one half of the 
developed world was controlled by the United states and the other 
by the Soviet Union, what should China do to break out of the 
encirclement? How could China counter the pressures of the 
superpowers.? Clearly the only way was to form a counter-alliance 
by winning the support of all elements which were not hostile to 
China, including the neutrality of the middle elements. In The 
Art of War, Mr. Sun Zi, an ancient Chinese military expert, 
discussed the strategy of survival and breakthrough by an army in 
difficulty: 
When the enemy is powerful, look for its internal 
contradiction, divide it, and then concentrate all your 
power to attack its weakest link. 17 
This surely is the only way for China to fight her way out of 
encirclement. But how to apply this strategy: how to look for the 
enemy's internal contradiction? how to divide it? and what forces 
17 see Sun Zi The Art of War. Sun Zi was one of Mao Tsetung's 
favourite writers. It is said that Mao carried his books all 
along with him even in the hardest days during the Long March. 
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are you going to concentrate? These are Mao Tsetung's 
contributions. For him, while Sun Zi's strategy pointed out the 
way to survival, the very key was in organizational matters--- in 
correctly distinguishing true enemies from true friends, and 
temporary allies from eternal comrades. In "An Analysis of the 
Classes in the Chinese Society", he wrote, 
Who are our enemies? who are our friends? He who does not 
know how to distinguish his enemies from his friends cannot 
be a revolutionary, yet at the same time it is no easy task 
to distinguish them. If the Chinese revolution ... has shown 
such meager results, it is not the goal but the tactics 
which have been wrong. The tactical error committed is 
precisely the inability to rally one's true friends in order 
to strike at one's enemy. 18 
With the assistance of this strategy, Mao was able to survive 
the hardest times in his career. In each of the wars against the 
warlords(l925-1927), against the Nationalists (1927-1949) and 
against the Japanese{l936-1945), he was able to defeat strong 
enemies with his guerilla forces . 19 
In international politics, Mao Tsetung perceived basically 
the same dynamic. For him, as for many other realists in the 
international arena, the rest of the world influences a country 
in three ever-present ways: it threatens it; it trades with it 
18 Mao Tsetung "Analysis of the Various Classes in the 
Chinese Society"(1926) in Selected Works Vol.1,1969. 
19 A notable example is Mao's treatment of the Xian Incident. 
When Chiang Kaishi was arrested by his generals in the December 
of 1936 in Xian, Mao Tsetung did not take the opportunity to 
eliminate his rival. Instead he helped secure Chiang's release. 
Subsequently he made Chiang declare war against Japan. His 
calculation was that while Japan had become the greatest threat 
to China and his program, his contradictions with Chiang could be 
put off until after the defeat of the Japanese. 
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and thus helps it; or it lends its influence in support of it or 
against it. 20 When friendship, support and influence could not 
be obtained from one group, they surely can be won from another 
group, and when there is not enough muscle in one's own body to 
compete with one's rival, he surely has to rally the support of 
others. The crucial task for China is, therefore, to sort out the 
external environment in such terms as "friendly forces", 
"intermediate forces" and "hostile forces" , and properly fit 
them into a scheme to isolate enemies, just as was done in 
domestic politics. The three world doctrine performed exactly 
this function. By differentiating the three worlds, Mao Tsetung 
cleared away the key questions of who to rely upon, who to unite 
with, and who to strike at. By differentiating the three worlds, 
he also made the tactical scheme of how to oppose strong enemies 
when one's capabilities are weak. 
20 The systemic model in international relations theory 
explains "why the actors do what they do" in terms of reaction to 
the external environment." see the chapter entitled "A System, a 
system, the kingdom is a system" in Theories and Approaches to 
International Politics Patrick M. Morgan, 1987. 
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Chapter III China's Relations with The Third World 
China's credentials with third world countries are clear. 
Since 1949, she has enthusiastically encouraged their national 
independence from Western suzerains; she has extended generous 
assistance to their economic construction programs; she has 
received their national leaders with the highest honors; and she 
has also advocated their political and economic interests at 
every international forum. In short, as Harris and Worden 
observe, "on every appropriate occasion, whether greeting the 
People's Congress, or addressing the United Nations General 
Assembly, Beijing's leaders and spokesmen have unanimously 
asserted that China is a member of the Third World. 111 
The Implications of the Third World 
What does China intend to achieve through identifying herself 
with the third world? And how does the third world as a group fit 
into the Three world doctrine? And how could China identify 
herself with the third world? 
1 The third world, of course, has not been so enthusiastic. 
See Lillian Craig Harris and Robert L. Worden China and the Third 
World Auburn House: Mass.,1986, p.1. 
To answer these questions, one needs, first of all, to look 
at what the third world is. The Third World is a collective name 
ref erring to those economically poor and underdeveloped nations 
which stand in contrast to the developed capitalist world. It 
consists of over 125 nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America 
and constitutes over 70 per cent of the world's population. 
Theese countries are rich in natural resources but are mostly 
small in size, diverse in culture, and different in perception of 
national interests. For a very long time in history they were 
colonies of Western countries. 
At the same time, the third world is the fastest changing 
part of the world, both in political and economic capabilities. 
Since World War II, third world countries have won freedom and 
independence from colonial rule one after another, and now over 
120 of them are members of the United Nations. The third world 
emerged as a powerful political force in international relations 
in 1964 at the meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) when a bloc of Asian and Latin American 
countries began to meet as a Caucus of 77 to achieve political 
goals through voting solidarity. Since then it has functioned as 
a decision-making bloc in the United Nations General Assembly. 
Although the third world nations still split on some issues due 
to their cultural and national differences, on key issues, 
especially those dealing with economic development, ending 
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colonialization, sovereignty and human rights, 2 they have shown a 
record of almost complete voting solidarity. As a result, they 
can almost always raise a two-thirds majority vote in the General 
Assembly, meaning that the United States, the Soviet Union and 
Western Europe constantly find themselves on the losing side. 3 
The implications of these characteristics on China's global 
strategy and her policy toward the third world in particular is 
clear. The growing capabilities of the third world could not 
escape China's vision. When looked at individually, these third 
world countries are economically poor and politically weak, 
especially when they are viewed in light of their percentage of 
World GNP, but if they act in concert, they decisively broaden or 
narrow the maneuvering room of other countries, including the 
superpowers. Their voting power in the United Nations Assembly 
and their role in world energy crises4 testify that this 
assertion ·is not at all extravagant. In any case, the third 
world constitutes a viable force in world politics for China who 
was then drowned in the midst of external hostility and 
diplomatic isolation. 
2 Other major issues on which they have often found 
themselves in solidarity include the establishment of a new 
international economic order and the establishment of cartel 
arrangements to control supply and fix world prices for such 
products as oil, copper, bauxite, sugar and coffee etc. 
3 It should be pointed out that voting patterns in the 
United Nation have shifted considerably the last couple of 
years.---author. 
4 A notable example is the role of rising oil prices in the 
recession of the industrial countries in 1973. 
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on the Chinese side, too, it was also a natural tendency that 
she would identify herself with the world's underdogs. First, the 
third world is the only force available in international politics 
that could be really motivated to support China. In the post-war 
era, the industrial world was completely polarized between the 
two superpowers, the east dominated by the Soviet Union and the 
west by the United States. The third world was, in comparison, 
the only "free world" over which a third power other than the two 
superpowers could exert influence. It was, therefore, 
situationally determined that the "poor" and "weak" third world 
should be taken by China as the mainstay of her united 
international front. 
Second, the third world has the political motivation to be 
allied with China. In his report to the People's Congress on 
China's foreign relations(1954), Chu Jung-fu, then vice foreign 
minister, assessed the potential of the third world's support, 
•.. colonial and semi-colonial states have either won 
national independence or are engaged in the struggle for 
national independence. Both the Chinese people and the 
people of these countries have for a long time been 
subjected to the oppression and exploitation of imperialism 
and have suffered long enough ••• They share a common 
interest in the wiping out of colonialism~ and there are no 
basic conflicts of interest among them ... 
Clearly, in the Chinese evaluation, the fact that the third world 
countries were colonized by the West would make them natural 
allies of China, and for the extent to which they had suffered at 
5chu Jung-fu "Foreign relations of new China during the past 
five years', World Culture, 5 Oct. 1954, in current Background~ 
no. 307, 6 Dec. 1954. pp.1-9. 
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the hand of their suzerains, they would be most resolute in will 
and most persistent in action to resist the hegemony of the 
superpowers. It was, therefore, politically possible to integrate 
their aspiration for independence into China's counter-superpower 
struggle. 
China's Policy Goals 
As with the development of the three world doctrine itself, 
China's foreign policy toward the third world also went through 
several stages of change and there is an apparent symmetry 
between the two. The earliest interest of China in the third 
world was mainly related to two factors: their common historical 
experiences and China's ideological expectations. Both China and 
the majority of the third world countries had suffered 
colonization by the Western countries. Out of sympathy and 
largely influenced by the spectacular success of her own, the 
Chinese leadership genuinely wished that these countries would 
soon win independence on the model of the Chinese revolution. 
Secondly, driven by her ideological preferences, the Chinese 
leadership expected that the third world countries would quickly 
join the socialist camp and that their movements for national 
liberation and independence would soon sweep across the rest of 
Asia, Africa and Latin America. (It should be emphasized that 
this expectation was not an integral part of China's own program. 
It was mostly the result of sympathy and ideological 
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preferences.) Thus, during the early 1950, China carried a 
contradictory attitude toward the Third World. On the one hand, 
she believed that the third world countries were a progressive 
force in international politics, but on the other she felt 
dissatisfied with them and even regarded them as reactionary for 
their neutralism in a world of clear division. 
However, by 1954 the Chinese rejection of the third world's 
non-alignment began to change. Obviously, the change was a part 
of the total adjustment of China's perception of the world system 
and her place in world affairs. As has been discussed in the 
previous chapter, the focus of China's foreign policy has always 
been centred around concerns about her international position and 
national security which are largely determined by her 
relationship with the superpowers. With the dynamics of the two-
camp politics running out in the mid-1950s, China began to 
conceive an independent role in international relations. She 
perceived in the neutral third world a potential political base 
upon which she could establish herself and in non-alignment a 
convenient tool to counterbalance the influence of the 
superpowers. Therefore, in contrast to her earlier attitude 
toward the third world countries, the Chinese no longer regarded 
their neutrality as conservative or reactionary, but rather that 
the more neutral and the more independent they were, the better 
for China. 
The first step along this line was taken by Zhou Enlai, 
China's premier and foreign minister, at Bandung in 1954. Instead 
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of encouraging the Asian and African countries to join the 
socialist camp, as China had always done, Zhou Enlai advocated 
the Five Principles of Peaceful co-existence6 as the basis of 
Chinese foreign policy. The five principles include respect for 
each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity; abstention 
from aggression and threats against each other; non-interference 
in the internal affairs of one another; recognition of equality 
of all nations large and small; and mutual benefit in economic 
and cultural relations. The significance of the raising of the 
five principles,. as was demonstrated by China's subsequent policy 
behaviour, could never be overestimated. It marked a shift in 
China's general attitude toward the existing world order and the 
perception of her future role in world affairs. First, it was an 
open deviation from, if not yet total negation of, the two-camp 
doctrine and the "leaning to one side" policy. Second, it 
refuted, in effect, the legitimacy of the Soviet leadership over 
other countries and China in particular. And thirdly, it 
manifested China's intention to establish her own sphere of 
influence. In short, as Mao Tsetung's "Great Disorder Under 
Heaven117 indicates, by stressing equality, China was encouraging 
6 The Five Principles were included in the joint agreement 
signed between China and India in April 1954. 
7 This is recalled from my memory of my school days when 
every child in school learned Mao Tsetung's speeches, although I 
can not remember whether it is a poem or a speech. But certain am 
I about its gist: the current international situation is 
characterized by disorder, the greater the disorder, the better 
for revolution. Deng Xiao Ping's speech at the UN Assembly of 
1974 also mentioned the great disorder under heaven wherein all 
the political forces in the world go through drastic division and 
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a policentric world order and a realignment of world forces. 
Following the Bandung conference, China initiated a series of 
diplomatic actions which were totally independent of Soviet 
influence or camp concerns. She fostered cooperation with India 
and Burma with whom she had border problems. She established 
diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, Nepal, Egypt, Syria, Yeman 
and Ceylon, all of which had social systems vastly different from 
her own. She even sought to improve relations with neighbouring 
countries such as Pakistan and Iraq that had committed themselves 
to various forms of military alignment with the United States. 
The net intention of these actions was to establish the basis for 
a provisional alliance between the neutralist third world 
countries and China, and, in addition, "to project the image of a 
modern, rapidly developing, cooperative society deserving of 
legal and political recognition as an important member of the 
world community". 8 
If this policy change manifested only China's intention to 
break out of the diplomatic encirclement imposed by the United 
States, its intention toward the Soviet Union was soon 
demonstrated without ambiguity at the second Afro-Asian 
conference. Like the first conference, this second one was a club 
gathering convened to discuss national independence movements. In 
keeping with China's usual attitude on the subject matter, the 
conference should have made a place for the Soviet Union who was 
realignment. see also Peking Review April 19,1974. p.11. 
8 Camelleri. Ibid. pp.79. 
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then still regarded by China as the leader of world revolution. 
Nevertheless, China opposed Soviet participation on the ground 
that she was not an Asian or African country. When resentment 
grew among the third world countries not at odds with Moscow and 
it appeared that China might not get her way, she threatened to 
withdraw. In 1966, when the first Tricontinental Conference {The 
First Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and 
Latin America) was held in Pro-Moscow Havana, China made efforts 
to convene a similar one in Beijing. Clearly, what China was most 
concerned about was not ideological solidarity or the expansion 
of the socialist camp, but rather the exclusion of competing 
influences. Looked at from these perspectives, China's third 
world policy---its encouragement for national independence and 
non-alignment---was nothing but the product of careful 
calculation of national interests, despite the fact that she had 
historically supported these countries out of sympathy and 
proletarianism. China's dominant value was to establish a pro-
China political constituency in the international community which 
would help China break out of the diplomatic isolation drawn by 
the superpowers. 
The Instruments of Policy 
Needless to say, the third world policy was carried out 
within the parameters of realpolitik, both at the level of policy 
pronouncement and execution. At the former level, China 
highlighted everywhere the points of conflict between the third 
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world and the superpowers and underscored the points of identity 
between the third world and herself through condemning the 
injustice of the existing world order, calling for equal 
sovereignty for all, and politicizing issues of international 
concern related to the third world. The definitions of the 
"superpower" and the "third world", for instance, were given full 
political significance, in contrast to the ordinary academic 
sense that describes them in terms of their aggregate power 
potentials and their levels of economic development. In his 
speech at the above-mentioned UN General Assembly, Deng xiao Ping 
defined that "a superpower is an imperialist country which 
everywhere subjects other countries to its aggression, therefore 
control, subversion or plunder and strives for world hegemony" 
whereas a third world country is exactly the victim of the 
superpower ambitions. 9 On the other hand, China described her 
own position as one who shared the destiny of the third world and 
was dedicated to the fight against imperialism and hegemonism. 
China is not a superpower, nor will she ever seek to be 
one •.. If one day China should change her color and turn 
into a superpower, if she too should play the tyrant in the 
world .•. the people should identify her as social 
imperialism, expose it, opJ>ose it and work with the Chinese 
people to overthrow it ... 
A corollary to the characteristic of high politicization is 
vagueness and lack of precision in using technical terms. In the 
majority of her policy pronouncements, it was never indicated 
9see Deng Xiaoping's speech Peking Review Ibid. 
10 Deng's speech Peking review Ibid. 
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where the edges of the term's meaning were. For instance, when 
did China become a third world country? Do all of the socialist 
countries belong to the third world? Do such countries as Cuba of 
the 1960s and Vietnam of the late 1970s belong to the third 
world? These questions were not clarified. on the contrary, terms 
such as peace-loving nations and third world countries were often 
used interchangably. The effect is that there is left a wide 
margin of flexibility for determining the real meaning of China's 
policy. These characteristics were not the result of mindless 
mistakes, but of tactical deliberation. The value-laden 
definition, in effect, served to draw a line between the first 
world on the one side and the third world on the other. It also 
helped the third world, with which China had pledged 
identification, to align itself accordingly in international 
affairs, without alienating vacillating elements or locking up 
her own hands. 
Thus, in practice we saw many faces of China in her relations 
with the third world: leader as well as supporter, champion as 
well as benefactor, all played out in reference to its objectives 
and the circumstances of the time. During the whole 1960s and the 
early part of the 1970s, China extended substantial aid on a 
fairly sustained basis to over 70 third world countries and 
supported them through political, economic and cultural grant-
programs. In the 7 years from 1968 to 1976 alone, the volume of 
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foreign aid amounted to US$3000 millions. 11 As she was 
militarily antagonized and diplomatically isolated during that 
period, China made winning the support of the third world 
countries the highest objective of her foreign policy. Among the 
tactics she used was her conscious effort to portray herself as 
different from other big countries. Thus, we find remarkable not 
only China's aid volume compared with her own economic scale, but 
also her aid pattern which was so different from those of the 
Soviet and Western loans. Much of China's assistance consisted 
chiefly of outright grants. Even in cases of loans she allowed 
very low rates of interest and very long periods for repayment. 
She also excluded from her aid materials which were readily 
available in recipient countries. These created differences 
portrayed Chinese economic and technical aid as a concrete 
manifestation of her true identity with the third world and as a 
valuable element in the "common"task of national construction and 
the "common" struggle against imperialism. Although such aid 
arrangements made China's own economic construction additionally 
constrained, the very fact of China's unwealthy economy made her 
especially heroic and heart-touching. China was only too pleased 
to derive the political advantage from the contrast painted 
between her approach to economic aid and that of other big 
powers. This helped China obtain not only maneuvering room in a 
time of diplomatic isolation, but also broad political support in 
11 Hsueh Chun-tu China's foreign Relations Praeger:1982, 
p.42. 
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the international community. In 1971, China was voted into the 
United Nations in spite of the strong opposition of the United 
states. 
Once recognized in the international community, as symbolized 
by her accession to the United Nations, China began to adopt the 
posture of a champion of third world interests to increase her 
influence in international affairs. International forums became a 
convenient vehicle for her to realize this goal. By offering 
moral support to favoured third world initiatives and rejoinders 
to the developed world for its imperialist, colonialist, or 
protectionist attitude toward developing countries, she presented 
herself as a leader in the debate between the two sides. 
According to Harris and Worden's finding, the importance of third 
world development and the effects of the first and second world's 
political, economic and military policies on development have 
been the themes of every address China's representatives have 
delivered at annual UN opening seesion since 1971. 12 A tangible 
example is her call for the long-sought third world goal of a new 
international economic order: 
The third world countries strongly demand that the present 
extremely unequal international economic relation be 
changed, and they have made many rational proposals of 
reforms. The Chinese government and people warmly endorse 
and firmly support all just propositions made by the third 
world countries. 13 
12 Harr is and Worden. Ibid. p. 12 5. 
13 Peking Review April 19,1974. p.10. 
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All such initiatives tipped the balance of influence between 
China and the superpowers so much that the latter constantly 
found themselves in the minority at international forums. 
The third world policy accrued China other benefits as well. 
By paying special attention to its small Asian neighbours, the 
policy contributed to enhancing China's security interest. It 
could be easily recognized that of all the third world regions, 
south and Southwest Asia received the bulk of China's foreign 
policy attention for geopolitical reasons. Geographically 
adjacent to the Southern border of China, the relation between 
the countries in question and China are traditionally described 
as "lips and teeth". Since the end of its empire age, China has 
attempted to establish "good neighbour relations" with them. With 
the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance, the strategic 
importance of the region was more than ever buttressed. The 
United states had stationed troops to China's east and southeast 
in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines etc., and the 
Soviet Union had built up massive military forces on its northern 
border. Now the Soviet Union was taking initiatives to expand its 
influences in India and meant, from China's perspective, to 
encircle it from the south. China had certainly to take 
corresponding actions in the region to thwart the perceived 
Soviet intention. By extending generous aid and frequently 
sending goodwill delegations, the third world policy paved 
China's way into Pakistan, Burma, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangaledash 
and Indochina, countries which geopolitically "counter-
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encircled" India. From 1968 to 1978, the above countries received 
US$ 1000 millions in peace time aid, accounting for 39 percent of 
the total foreign aid China committed during the period. 14 
The third world policy portrayed an image of China as 
"neither leader nor follower, yet both champion as well 
supporter". The motive of this policy is obvious and the lesson 
is also clear. To thwart the intention of a powerful hostile 
alliance, the best way is to strengthen one's own alliance by 
whatever means. However, other questions still remain, 
especially, if the above policy had been a function of a siege 
mentality, the consciousness of being encircled by hostile and 
hegemonic predators. Can China maintain her policy now that the 
environment has so dramatically changed? This question will be 
discussed in the fifth chapter. 
14 Hsueh Chun-tu China's Foreign Relations Praeger:l982,p.41 
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Chapter IV: China's Relations With The second World 
When the representative of China and his counterpart from the 
European Economic Community signed the agreement on mutual 
cooperation in 1975, the world witnessed one of the most dramatic 
breakthroughs in modern diplomacy. China became the first 
communist country (Yugoslavia excepted) to recognize the 
organization of capitalist countries. The event thus signified a 
tilt in China's foreign policy toward Western Europe. At the same 
time the event also manifested a clear difference between China's 
approach toward this part of the world and its approach toward 
the third world. Rather than embracing wholeheartedly or 
championing enthusiastically, as she did to the third world, 
China looked at the second world with an eye half filled with 
suspicion. The Chinese representative insisted on incorporating 
into the agreement an "antihegemonism" clause. 1 
How did China come to deal with the second world differently 
than with the third world? Why should China court the second 
world whom she did not trust? And how well did the second world 
fit into the scheme of China's three worlds differentiation? 
These same questions have to be asked if we are to understand the 
overall pattern of China's foreign behaviour. This chapter will 
1 The same clause was incorporated into the Treaty of Peace 
and Friendship signed between China and Japan in 1978. 
discuss the various dilemmas imposed on China's policy thrust by 
the political ambivalence of the second world. It will also trace 
the calculations the Chinese policy makers made in their dealings 
with these countries. 
The Implications of the Second world 
The second world comprises the small and medium-sized 
capitalist countries, namely western Europe and Japan. As a 
group, these countries share such characteristics as being 
economically well-developed and politically "vacillating" or 
"conservative". While in the past they had been major colonial 
powers that "exploited" and "oppressed" the people of the third 
world, including the Chinese,, they were closely associated with 
the United States---china's major antagonist---through political 
and military alliances after the second World War. At the same 
time, however, they were not identical with the United States, 
but had contradictions with her. While they got nuclear 
protection through alliance with the United States, they lost 
much of their identity which was once so distinguished in 
international affairs. 
These characteristics put Western Europe and Japan in a very 
uncertain position in China's political spectrum: neither friend 
nor enemy, yet both friend and enemy. Indeed, since coming to 
power in 1949, the Chinese leadership had consistently attempted 
to fit them into a well-defined theoretical framework, only to 
find that there existed no clear answer to that question. In the 
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1950s, for instance, when China adhered to the Soviet two-camp 
concept of international relations, Western Europe was considered 
to be a subordinate part of the American-dominated camp. The 
intensity of the cold war denied the possibility of an 
independent European foreign policy, as Mao Tsetung declared, 
all people, without exception, must lean either to the 
side of socialism, or to the side of capitalism. 
Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third 
road. 2 
By the end of the 1950s when the relationship between China and 
the Soviet Union began to decline, that rigid view became shaken. 
Responding to both the internal dissension within Nato as well as 
to the deepening Sino-Soviet conflict, Mao Tsetung began to take 
a more flexible and dialectic view of the second world. Not only 
did he start to notice the vacillating nature of second world 
politics, but also began to emphasize its progressive side. In an 
interview with a visiting French parliamentary delegation in 
January 1964, Mao Tsetung is reported to have defined the 
political role of Western Europe and Japan in the following 
manner, 
La France ••. , l'Allemagne, L'Italie, l'Angletterre a 
condition qu'elle cesse d'etre courtier de l'Amerique, 
le Japan et nous-meme---Voila le tiers monde. 3 
How did Mao Tsetung's dialectics come to define the changing 
role of the second world in that manner? The answer is simple 
enough. First, with the threat of the United States and the 
2 Mao Tsetung Selected Works vol.4, p.415. 
3L'Humanite (Paris) Feb 21, 1964, p.3 
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soviet Union being perceived as the principal contradiction with 
China, the contradictions with "certain other imperialist 
powers", which were once salient and sharp, were reduced to a 
secondary status. Second, the tactical necessity of 
"concentrating all forces to deal with principal contradictions" 
defies the ideas of struggling against many contradictions at one 
time. Thus, the political positions of Western Europe and Japan 
were anatomized as an intermediate zone floating and flirting 
between the first world and the third world. They were to be 
reappraised from time to time in accordance with the changes of 
the international situation. According to Mao Tsetung, these 
countries 
oppress and exploit the oppressed nations and are at 
the same time controlled and bullied by the 
superpowers. They have a dual character and stand in 
contradiction with both the first and third worlds. But 
they are still a force the third world can win over or 
unite with in the struggle against the hegemonism. 4 
This is perhaps a unique aspect Mao Tsetung added to the theory 
of international relations. The dialectical analysis solved the 
ambivalence and difficulty which had hitherto existed in China's 
"agonizing appraisal" of the second world. 
China's Policy Goals 
4 Beijing Review Nov.4, 1977. 
52 
Specifically, China had three distinct foreign policy 
interests in the second world: global balance of influence, 
strategic security, and defense modernization, in that order of 
importance. Politically, the second world stood between the first 
world and the third world, or, in a narrower sense, between the 
superpowers and China, and was thus vital to both of them. 
Hitherto, the superpowers had dealt with the Chinese, the 
Europeans, and the Japanese as discrete entities, often at odds 
with each other, and not as independent actors pursuing joint 
foreign policy interests within a loose framework of cooperation. 
The strengthening of Sino-second world relations would certainly 
pose a difficulty for both of the superpowers on the one hand 
and, on the other, give themselves(the medium powers) greater 
scope as important actors in their own light. In either case, for 
China, a good Sino-second world relation would be a powerful 
thwart to the superpowers' plan to isolate her. Thus, China 
would naturally expect that the second world would be more 
independent, separated from the United States and opposed to the 
Soviet Union. 
Militarily, both Western Europe and Japan occupy geographical 
positions that would directly affect China's security interests. 
Western Europe stood on the frontline between the United states 
and the Soviet Union, both of whom considered Europe as their 
frontline and target of contention. An independent Europe would, 
thus, mean no less than a thorn in both of their sides. While the 
United states might feel it was losing the most with Europe's 
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"independence", much of Soviets' military forces would also be 
pinned down in the European theatre if Europe were made friendly 
to China. Japan was yet another case of this nature. She was the 
most important ally of the United states in the Pacific, lying at 
the east gate of China and standing in the way of the Soviets' 
southward aspirations. From a strategic point of view, none of 
the three great powers could afford to lose her for the global 
balance of power in the long run. In the short run, suffice it to 
say that if Japan were made independent, China would be relieved 
of much immediate military pressure. 
Thirdly, better relations with the second world would provide 
China with the advanced weapons and technology required to bring 
her defense to modern standards. One of the major weaknesses of 
China, in comparison with the superpowers, was the backwardness 
of her weaponry. To improve her international position 
fundamentally, China had to build up her weapon industry and 
military forces, in addition to manipulating a shift in the 
balance of political influnce. Western Europe and Japan were the 
only sources available at the time. The importance of the second 
world to China was nowhere made more clear than by Deng Xiaoping 
in one of his speeches on the prospects of Sino-Japanese 
relations, 
If China and Japan could cooperate with each other, 
they could support half the Heaven. 5 
If Japan and Western Europe fit admirably into the 
5Hsueh. Ibid. p.45. 
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scheme of China's foreign policy, then how well did China fit the 
need of the Europeans and the Japanese? This is an equally 
important question, for without their consent Mao Tsetung's 
dialectical reasoning is merely an elusive speculation. Without 
doubt, neither Japan nor Western Europe could expect to gain as 
much as China in improving their relations. Nevertheless, they 
still had political, strategic, and economic interests in the 
undertaking. In the first place, the Europeans were also seeking 
changes in the existing international political structure at the 
time. They were aspiring for autonomy from the United States on 
the one hand and were opposed to Soviet pressure on the other. In 
this sense, they were riding on the same boat with China. Placed 
in the political context of balance of influence, China was 
certainly the most effective tool of their deterrence against the 
Soviet Union and the heaviest counter of their bargaining with 
the United States. For not withstanding the temporary fact that 
China was still a secondary player on the global stage, her 
potential to rise to quasi-superpower status would augument the 
international weight of her partners. In the second place, 
better relations with China would provide Europe with an enormous 
economic market. While the Europeans had only a limited need for 
the products of China, the Chinese maintained a large demand for 
European industrial commodities. Looked at from these 
perspectives, just as China needed the cooperation of the second 
world to help her break out of political encirclement and further 
increase her role in the balance of power, the second world found 
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China an equally "objective ally" in their search for a new and 
expanded role in rapidly changing international environment. 6 
The Instruments of Policy 
Against this general background, we can now analyze a few 
representative cases to see how China's political and strategic 
calculations were translated into her policy actions. In short, 
China's typical approach to the second world is to drive wedges 
between them and the superpowers. In an article published by the 
New China News Agency on August 15, 1972, the peak of the 
monetary crisis in the Western world, the author commented on the 
differences between the United states and Western Europe in the 
following manner, 
The United states, by making the most of its position, 
hopes to force the West European countries into 
sacrificing their own economic interests to preserve 
the dollar's position, weakening daily, and to maintain 
the dollar's privileged status as a reserve currency in 
the capitalist world. This tactic has provoked the 
Western European countries' sharp displeasure. 7 
The purpose of these comments was unquestionable: it was to 
invite frictions between Western Europe and the United states and 
to encourage rebellion of the former against the latter. In a 
time of two years during that period, the Peking press devoted 
much space to explaining the significance of those antagonisms 
6 Hsueh. Ibid. p.100. 
7Alain Bouc "Peking now wants a United Europe" The Atlantic 
Community Quarterly Vol X, summer 1972. pp.167-173. 
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and reported regularly on European developments. "It pounced 
gleefully on the increased frequency of disagreements and 
savoured the memory of the 'steel war', the 'oil war', the 'wheat 
war' and the 'chicken war'. 118 
Among all of China's second world connections, France was 
most telling of the nature of this relationship. France was the 
first European country to break official relations with Taiwan; 9 
she was the most insistent on the devaluation of the dollar; and 
she was the only one that declared withdrawal from the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. Needless to say, the French steps 
were not taken with the intention to facilitate China's 
diplomatic endeavours. Neither De Gaulle nor Mao Tsetung, as 
could be observed in China's vehement assault on French 
imperialism and colonialism in Indochina, hedged much sentiment 
about each other. But at all events, both sides saw immediate 
advantages in establishing good mutual relations. For China, a 
good relationship with France---a developed European country---
would mean a diplomatic breakthrough in the Western line. It 
would, thus, entail great symbolic significance to her political 
status in international relations. For France, on the other side, 
it would quite dramatically underline her new-found independence 
with respect to her American custodian, and it would open up a 
8Alain Bouc. Ibid. p.169. 
9 Though Britain was the first European country to recognize 
the PRC, she also maintained a consulate on the island of Taiwan 
and her embassy in Beijing was led by a charge d'affair instead 
of an ambassador. 
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great market for her booming economy.In the eyes of some 
observers, the relations between Beijing and Paris elaborated "a 
median line of strategy"---one of independence and development in 
the face of the Soviet-American mutual understanding about the 
post-war world political structure."10 In fact, the announcement 
of the establishment of Sino-Franch diplomatic relations in 1964 
provoked outrage in Washington and displeasure in Moscow. 
China's attitude toward the European Community developed 
almost along the same latitude. In the beginning, European 
integration and the establishment of the Common Market were 
viewed in Peking as negative outcomes of the contradictions 
among capitalist countries and a new intrigue to exploit 
underdeveloped nations. But Mao Tsetung stopped short at this 
point in his ideological imagination: he did not extend his 
contradiction theory to predict an automatic collapse of the 
capitalist world due to the internal split of Western Europe. 
Instead, his dialectics led him to reason from the reverse side 
and made him believe that if these countries wanted to increase 
their autonomy in decision-making, they must fight the big 
powers' hegemony, form new groups, and possibly achieve distinct 
political unity. With De Gaulle's ever-growing demand for 
"independence" and the rapid ascendence of the European Community 
in economic affairs, Mao Tsetung recognized Western Europe as a 
"third force" of international politics. China thus began to 
support further European integration and emphasized the 
10 Hsueh. Ibid. p.88. 
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collective power of Europe in counterbalancing superpowers. As 
New China emphasized on the admission of Great Britain into the 
Community, 
a Common Market of ten countries would surpass the 
United States in gold reserves, steel and automobile 
production, and exports: "This new situation in Western 
Europe would be a serious obstacle to the US-USSR 
hegemony in Europe. 11 
Thus Sino-EC relations expanded concurrently with the bilateral 
relations with its respective members. 
The normalization of the Sino-Japanese relationship is even 
more delicate and subtle than that of Sino-France or Sino-EC. At 
the time of normalization in September 1972, Japan's prime 
minister, Tanaka, proposed that a number of agreements on 
technical aspects of Sino-Japanese relations, such as aviation, 
trade, shipping and fishery, be concluded. But the Chinese 
premier, Chou En-lai, dismissed them as mere "trifles". Instead, 
he proposed that the two governments sign a political protocol 
which was to include an anti-hegemony clause before they set to 
discuss operational agreements. The relevant questions concerning 
this abnormal procedure was again part of China's concerns about 
Japan's role in the world balance of influnce. 
Along with political relations, trade relations between China 
and the second world also witnessed enormous expansion during 
this period. In 1970, the trade volume between China and Western 
Europe reached $1,427 millions, doubling that between China and 
11 Alain Bouc. Ibid. p.173. 
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the whole East Bloc. Trade with the then ten members of the 
European Community alone amounted to $604 millions. 
Although the differences in scale and conditions with the 
second world were considerable, the diplomatic recognition of the 
Peking government by the second world enabled China to achieve 
significant influence vis-a-vis the superpowers. Viewed in 
retrospect, it was the second world connection that ultimately 
elevated China onto the world stage of powers. The event produced 
a clear moral: in international politics, when an influential 
force is neither friend nor enemy, the best policy is to win it 
over, or at least not to alienate it. Although it sounds a little 
Machiavallian, it is dangerous to make judgements in white and 
black. 
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Chapter v: A New Reality, A New Phase 
If China's foreign policy in the 1960s and the early part of 
the 1970s was obsessed with courting the support of the third 
world to counterbalance the United States and the Soviet Union, 
the turn of the 1970s saw a dramatic movement toward cooperation 
with the United states. By 1979, China and the United States 
signed 15 bilateral agreements on trade, culture, science and 
technology, claims/assets, and even military cooperation. General 
consulates were opened in each other's major cities; American 
military jets were sold to Chinese armies and Chinese 
intelligence-gathering stations were used by American personnel; 
Chinese scholars and scientists were trained in American research 
institutes and American commodities were shipped in large 
quantity into Chinese ports. Above all, the defence ministers of 
the two countries frequently exchanged state visits. 1 What is the 
significance of this cooperation for Chinese foreign policy? Is 
it an expansion of or a deviation from the three world policy? 
1 In 1979, Chinese vice premier Deng Xiaoping and defense 
minister Geng Biao visited the United States and American vice 
president Walter Mondale and defense secretary Harold Brown 
visited China. 308 official Chinese delegations came to the 
United States while 40,000 Americans toured China. 700 Chinese 
students and visiting scholars were admitted into American 
research institutions. Bilateral trade between the two countries 
amounted to 2 billions dollars, an increase of 200 times from 
that of 1972. see Chun-tu Hsueh's statistics in China's Foreign 
Relations p.34. 
The United states As A Force of strategic Deterrence Against the 
soviet Union 
The answer to these questions again rests on the changes in 
the international environment that surrounded China and the 
changes in China's domestic needs. The end of the 1960s saw great 
changes in the international configuration of power. Among these 
changes was the shift in the scale of balance of power between 
the two superpowers: the relative decline of the United States 
and the continuing expansion of the Soviet Union. While the 
United States, with the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, 
gradually softened her past containment policy, the Soviet Union 
not only refused China's conciliatory gesture2 but intensified 
her involvement in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, culminating 
in her invasion of Afghanistan and alignment with Vietnam against 
China. The stark reality dawned upon the Chinese that although 
the United states was still a superpower, the threat to China's 
security largely derived from the Soviet Union and that the 
withdrawal of US military forces from Asia would, in effect, 
result in an absence of deterrence against the Soviet Union in 
the region. 
On the other hand, China's growing political and military 
capacity enhanced her position to be an important force in the 
global balance of power. While she still lacked sufficient power-
2 In 1975, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai suggested to his 
Soviet counterpart an agreement to prevent armed conflict on the 
border and to disengage the two nations' armed forces in the 
disputed area along the Ussuri River. 
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--both military and economic ---to compete with either the United 
States or the Soviet Union in global diplomacy, her enhanced 
diplomatic status, her political influence with the third world, 
and, above all, her gradually expanded military capability had 
lifted her into the position of a quasi-superpower. The United 
States, out of global strategic considerations, began to change 
her posture toward China. She not only denounced "hegemonism" in 
the Shanghai communique signed with China in 1972, 3 but endorsed 
some of China's military actions in South Asia. In short, the 
United states began to consider China a strategic force in 
international relations, especially in her relations with the 
Soviet Union. 
All these factors contributed to fundamental alterations in 
China's perception of the world situation and her role in 
international affairs. The entire world system, in the Chinese 
view, though still essentially bipolar, had undergone significant 
alterations in the direction of multipolarity. The fathers of 
realpolitik prescribed for later politicians two rules: that the 
foreign policies of a nation, especially those of a great power, 
are made in calculation for the maximizing of power and national 
interests, and that in the game of balance of power, the balancer 
must shift alignment constantly, but always in support of the 
3 According to Chun-tu Huseh, one of the subjects of Deng 
Xiaoping's negotiation in Washington in 1979 was America's 
endorsement of China's actions against Vietnam. see Chun-tu 
Huseh's China's Foreign Relations 
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weak to weaken the strong. 4 The case of Sino-American cooperation 
evolved exactly along these dimensions. Both sides perceived 
different opportunities and threats in the new interactions and 
especially in the relative shift in the balance of power between 
the two superpowers. Both sides saw common interests in 
cooperating with each other at this point of time. At bottom, the 
Chinese leaders were concerned about the stability of China's 
surroundings in Asia in face of the unrelenting buildup of the 
Soviet military and political pressure throughout China's 
periphery and were increasingly aware of the absence of strategic 
deterrence left by the withdrawal of the American forces from the 
region. The top priority for China's foreign policy, therefore, 
had become to heighten the US-Soviet antipathy or to promote 
cooperation between China and the United States to check the 
Soviet expansion. As the former Chinese foreign minister Huang 
Hua was reported to have said, 
By winning the United States over, we could concentrate all 
our forces to deal with the archenemy---revisionist Soviet 
social-imperialism5 
Once these assumptions were made, the reasoning behind the 
original differentiation of the three worlds became too natural 
to be refuted in the formulation of China's new policy 
respectively toward the United States and the Soviet Union. A 
content analysis of China's policy statements published in Peking 
4 see Cohen Realpolitik: Theory and Practice. 
5 Hsiung and Kim China In the Global Community. p.221 
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Review from 1972 to 1978 indicates that China had by that time 
not only abandoned the theme of superpower collusion, but had 
begun to emphasize contradictions and distinctions between the 
two rivals. A typical illustration is Deng Xiaoping's remark made 
during his visit to Washington in 1979, 
the root of unrest is in the contention for world 
hegemony between the two superpowers ••• but for quite 
some time, the Soviet Union is on the offensive, 
whereas the United states is on the defensive •.• The 
Soviet social-imperialism is the most dangerous source 
of war. 6 
Like the second world whose contradictions with the first world 
could be exploited to counterbalance the latter, the United 
states could be a force of the united international front in 
opposition to the archenemy, the Soviet Union. Thus in spite of 
their fundamental differences in ideology, social values, and 
political and economic systems, China found grave common concerns 
with the United states on a wide range of international issues 
such as the Soviet military incursion into Asia and Europe, the 
Soviet support for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and 
Soviet strategic ambitions in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. 
As the United States took "the China connection"as a cornerstone 
in her global strategy, China considered "the American 
connection" a powerful guarantee of her security. As Huan Xiang, 
the late director of China's strategic centre, explained, the 
6 see Beijing Review Feb. 16, 1979. p. 18. 
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gist of China's three world strategy, as it entered the late 
1970s, had been that 
Soviet social-imperialism is pushing a hegemonist policy of 
aggression and expansion and its spearhead is directed not 
only to the third World, and at the group of industrialized 
nations, primarily Japan and Western Europe(the second 
world] but more importantly right at the United states ..• 
and for the sake of safe-guarding world peace, all the 
countries and people opposed to Soviet expansion should 
united and wage a tit-for-tat struggle against soviet 
hegemonism. "7 
The United States As A source Of Modernization 
Paralleling her security and political concerns, there was 
another calculation that drove China toward cooperation with the 
United states: the desire for modernization. In contrast with the 
radicals, the so-called Gang of Four, who put ideological 
advancement ahead of everything else, the reform-minded 
leadership that came into power after Mao Tsetung's death took 
economic development as the priority of their administration. At 
the Eleventh Party Congress, Hua Guofeng, then chairman of the 
party, declared, 
We must build up an independent and fairly comprehensive 
industrial and economic system in our country by 1980. By 
then, farming must be basically mechanized,considerable 
increases in production must be made in agriculture, 
forestry, animal husbandry, side line production and 
fishery •.• [To realize this goal, China must] learn the 
strong points of all nations and countries, to learn from 
them all that is truly good in politics, economics, military 
affairs, science, technology, literature and arts. 8 
7 Huan Xinag "On Sino-US Relations" in Foreign Affairs 
Fall/1981.pp.35-53. 
8 Hua Guofeng, "Political Report To the 11th National 
Congress of the CCP" Peking Review August 26,1977, p.50. 
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At the first mention of this program, it might sound strange 
to casual observers of Chinese politics and indeed to some 
Chinese themselves that China, a country so much possessed by 
desires to change the international status quo, would open 
herself up and embark on economic cooperation with the West. The 
fact is, however, that since modernization is a major indicator 
of power status and the world view of the Chinese people is such 
as described before, modernization had always been one of the 
central concerns to the Chinese leadership. As a matter of fact, 
the politics of modern China since 1949 had focused primarily, 
although not exclusively, on how China could be transformed as 
rapidly as possible into an industrialized nation, equal to 
nations on the forefront of technological development. As early 
as when the first Constitution of the PRC was drafted, Mao 
Tsetung had declared, 
Our general objective is to strive to build a great 
socialist country ••. How long will it take to accomplish 
socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation 
and mechanization of agriculture and make China a great 
socialist country? We won't set a rigid time limit now. It 
will probably take a period of three five-year plans, or 
fifteen years, to lay the foundation. I think for us to 
build a great socialist country, about fifty years, or even 
ten five-year plans, will probably be enough .•• 9 
The plan was not put into implementation for two reasons. On 
the one hand, there was a lack of unity among the leaders about 
9 Mao Tsetung "On the Draft Constitution of the People's 
Republic of China, June 14,1954" Selected Works Vol. V (Peking: 
foreign Language Press, 1977) pp.141-2 
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the relationship between self-reliance and open-door strategy. 
Policies and programs for modernization vacillated from one model 
to another, resulting in a long period of inaction. On the other 
hand, the threatening international environment did not foster a 
congenial climate for China to undertake modernization programs. 
Rather than concentrating on economic construction, China had to 
devote her major attention to gathering the support of the third 
world to break out of the diplomatic encirclement imposed by the 
superpowers. 
The improvement of Sino-us relations and the fall of the Gang 
of Four ushered China into "a new historical period." In the 
first place, the United States' cooperation with China on 
international issues relieved China of her preoccupation with 
security matters. With the soviet Union continuing to be China's 
major threat and at the same time NATO's major antagonist, the 
strategic force of the United States and her allies was a de 
facto deterrent to the Soviet expansion to Asia. The Soviet 
Union could not attack China without transferring some of her 
forces from Europe to Asia. This had been made impossible by the 
constraints of the United States. Secondly, China's leadership 
had achieved relative unity in their views on the relationships 
between superstructure and economic foundations, and between 
international position and domestic development. Both Hua Guofeng 
and Deng Xiaoping frankly admitted that China was lagging behind 
some of the advanced countries, such as the United States, by as 
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much as fifty years, 10 and that to catch up China needed both to 
learn from the advanced nations and to develop her own scientific 
capacities. In short, as Michael Oksenberg observed, the reform-
minded leadership had three new visions about the contemporary 
internatonal situation which he termed as "confident 
nationalism". 11 First, they believed that the international 
status of a nation would ultimately depend on her comprehensive 
national capability and economic development in particular; 
second, they believed that the current international setting 
permitted China to concentrate on her domestic construction; and 
third, they believed that China could benefit from effective 
participation in the international economic system and her 
modernization needed the positive cooperation of the West. 
Different environments posed different opportunities for 
China, and, to be sure, different objectives would also require 
different strategies and tactics. 12 In this schematic design, it 
is quite clear, particularly when looked at from the economic and 
technical point of view, what role China was going to assign 
respectively to the third world, the second world and the first 
1° C.H. G. Oldham "Science and Technological Policies" China's 
Developmental Experience, Michael Oksenberg, ed. 
(Praeger:NY,1973) pp.80-94. 
11Michael Oksenberg "China's Confident Nationalism" in 
Foreign Affairs winter/1986.p.156. 
12 Classical scholars such as Rousseau and Grotius argue that 
because "actors touch each other at so many points" their 
behaviours could be understood as a complex pattern of 
action/reaction in which individual acts serve as feedback for 
targets---Ferguson.p.194. 
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world. Two reasons are obvious why China would have to adjust her 
previous posture toward them. One is that a corollary of the four 
modernization program is a recognition of China's technological 
backwardness. To improve that situation, China had to undertake 
scientific exchange programs to train her scientists abroad to 
raise the level of scientific knowledge at home. She would also 
have to import large quantities of advanced industrial techniques 
and to transfer the most advanced technologies. As her practice 
in the following years indicates, a major part of China's 
strategy was to open joint research projects and to purchase 
complete industrial plants from abroad, the so-called "turn-key" 
projects. Given the fact that advanced technology was almost 
monopolized in the United states, Western Europe and Japan, these 
countries would certainly draw more and more attention from 
China's policy makers. In fact, Japan, the United states, and 
Western Europe have been for years China's three largest trade 
partners. 
Secondly, the program called for an intimate political 
relationship with the United States. Although the world order was 
moving increasingly into multipolarity, the United States was 
still the political, economic and military leader of the West. It 
ran the biggest economy, possessed the most advanced technology, 
and above all remained the strongest member, if not the leader, 
of the "Group of Seven", the GATT, the Paris Organization, and 
the World Bank, etc .• To some extent she influenced the 
decisions of other Western nations. If China was to have the 
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economic and technical cooperation of the West, she must first 
obtain the political endorsement of the United States. 
All these factors, on the other hand, considerably downplayed 
the political role of the third world in China's global strategy. 
Although the third world was still professed in China's policy 
pronouncements as the basic focus of China's overall foreign 
policy, for some time it had been, in fact, China's periphery 
concern. Obviously, the third world, with whom China had so far 
identified herself, could neither provide the technology and 
investment China's modernization program required, nor could 
China, upon whom third world countries had so far laid 
expectations, afford to divest herself any more to support them. 
In one instance of departure, China organized a commercial 
engineering company which was comprised of many former foreign-
aid personnel to build bridges, water-supply projects, and 
railways in third world countries. As one article in the Beijing 
Review said, China had always supported the construction of the 
third world countries, but as China was going through economic 
adjustment herself, she had to reduce the scale of her 
international assistance. 13 The diminished importance of the 
third world in Chinese global policy was also evident in the 
sharp decline of the People's Daily's coverage of the NIEO, a 
conceptual and normative linkage between China and the third 
13Beijing Review Feb.16,1986. 
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world in what Samuel Kim calls global ecopolitics. 14 The trend 
promised that as China's modernization program heightened in 
scale and her interactions with the Western countries increased, 
her relations with the third world would be increasingly 
restrained within the boundaries of moral support, if not a total 
reversal of her role from champion to competitor. In the view of 
Lilian c. Harris, China had already begun to face credibility 
problems with the third world countries and would probably be 
burdened by negative political implications in the long run as 
the developed countries had been in the past. 15 
14 Samuel Kim "China and the third world in NIEO Politics" in 
Contemporary China 3, winter/1979. 
u Lillian c. Harris China and the Third World:Champion or 
Challenger Auburn House: 1986. p.5. 
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Assessment 
Now China is at another crossroad. After the Tiananmen 
Incident of 1989, the government of China is once again faced 
with diplomatic isolation. The Western industrialized countries, 
led by the Group of Seven, have declared that they would not 
resume normal relations with China unless her government 
continues to undertake political and economic liberalization. 
Thus, she is now fast caught in the dilemma of having to choose 
between giving up her communist ideology to go along with the 
world trend or to resist the West and be cut off from the 
international political and economic system. Just as when the 
communists came into power in 1949, China has again to answer the 
question of where to go. 
In Beijing, the view has been that the diplomatic isolation, 
though damaging to China's international image, will not last 
long, because her large market is so attractive that computer and 
other industrial manufacturers will be compelled to come back 
into China. The dynamic Pacific Rim economies, in particular, 
with their large foreign exchange earnings and rising labour 
costs at home, will not be able to wait long before seeking 
outlets in China for their export industries and capital. Thus, 
as long as China remains receptive to such investment, the 
attempts at diplomatic isolation will not succeed. The priority 
of China's current foreign policy, accordingly, is to sustain her 
diplomatic vitality by means of reviving diplomatic relations 
with the third world and to wait for opportunities to break the 
weak link in the Western line. 
Evidence from the last two years suggests that China is 
retreading her past road of the three worlds. During the last two 
years, her president, premier and foreign minister have paid 
frequent visits to such countries as Pakistan, Burma, Nepal, Sri 
Lanka, Mexico, Paraguay, Chile, Argentina and so on. China has 
made initiatives to reestablish diplomatic relations with 
Indonesia and Singapore, and has also moved in the direction of 
normalizing relations with Vietnam, Laos and Cuba. Clearly, China 
is again hoping to use the third world as a source of diplomatic 
leeway and as a counter-point against the perceived Western 
attempts of diplomatic isolation. 
Those attempts may in some degree ease her diplomatic 
difficulty as they have in the past, and, indeed, as business 
news from China on ventures by Japan's NEC and America's IBM and 
Boeing suggest, China may be succeeding on that score. The 
dilemma is, nevertheless, a fast knot. Unlike her struggles in 
the past, which were aimed to overthrow the international status 
quo of the time, she is now caught between the functional 
requirements of modernization, as defined in the mainstream 
thinking in the world's advanced capitalist countries, and the 
normative requirements of Marxism, which are the premise of her 
political existence. Because she had already attained the 
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international status she desired, and because she does not have 
the intention to upset the present international political and 
economic system, there does not exist the question of standing 
with one world against another. Instead, China knows very well 
what the USA MFN status, the World Bank loans, and the Japanese 
investment mean to her political and economic existence. For 
example, as soon as the G-7 made its political declaration in the 
November of 1989, Deng Xiaoping stressed to his subordinates that 
"China must return to the world stage. " 1 These considerations 
will limit China's foreign behaviour to a very pragmatic design. 
Thus, while it is still not clear how China is going to clear the 
mud---what policies she is going to carry toward the third world 
and the industrialized capitalist countries---it is certain that 
her revived interest in the third world will not last long and 
that her principal thrust is again to regain her diplomatic 
status among the major countries of the world. 
All in all, i~ spite of the current uncertainties in China's 
foreign policy behaviour, two conclusions may be safely drawn 
from the above analysis. One is that her foreign policy is built 
upon the premise of realpolitik, in spite of her value-laden 
rhetoric; the other is that her foreign policy undergoes constant 
shifts in order to better adjust to the external environment. 
During the first phase, from 1960 to 1970, the dominant value of 
China's global policy had been to break out of the diplomatic 
1 The content of the talk was circulated within the 
government, but not published---author. 
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encirclement set by the first world and to increase her political 
influence in the international community. Being a much weaker 
nation, both in military power and economic capability, the three 
world strategy enabled China to make capital of her very 
weakness. By disclaiming any superpower ambitions and by 
championing the cause of the poor and the proud, she was able to 
form a grand coalition in opposition. The 1970s, however, saw 
China moving ambiguously back and forth between the three worlds. 
The triangular relationship with the two superpowers permitted 
her to play upon the persisting tensions and divisions between 
the United States and the Soviet Union and, with the support of 
her growing capability, to act as a balancer between the two 
competing powers. The 1980s saw China move further away from the 
third world and closer to the industrial West. In order to gain 
the advanced technology and capital investment her modernization 
program needed, she undertook all-out cooperation with the United 
States and other Western industrialized countries. And finally, 
in the last two years, when her relations with the West suffered 
decline and faced another diplomatic isolation, she again turned 
to the third world. The following diagrams show how China's 
relations with the three worlds have changed during the past 
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In every one of the above cases, by the very nature of the 
three world differentiation, China attempted and was often able 
to thwart the threatening options available to her antagonists. 
To put it more straightforwardly, in the game against the first 
world, the three world strategy allowed China to play the cards 
of the third and second worlds, and, in the game against her 
archenemy, she played the card of one superpower against the 
other. Neither the cooling of her attitude toward the third world 
nor the warming of her relations with the first and second 
worlds, therefore, indicates China's abandonment of the three 
world strategy. They merely suggest the different dimensions and 
dialectics along which the doctrine is operated in practice. 
Above all, it is not difficult to discern that the concerns with 
the third world and, to some extent the second world, at best 
have a secondary role to play in determining China's approach to 
foreign affairs. China's foreign policy is based primarily on her 
perceived need for stability, security, and development, a policy 
that depends chiefly on China's relations with the United states 
and the Soviet Union. 
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